{"id":5268,"date":"2022-04-20T06:45:33","date_gmt":"2022-04-20T05:45:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/?p=5268"},"modified":"2025-06-11T06:51:09","modified_gmt":"2025-06-11T05:51:09","slug":"an-analysis-of-viktor-orbans-broad-electoral-success","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/2022\/04\/20\/an-analysis-of-viktor-orbans-broad-electoral-success\/","title":{"rendered":"An analysis of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s broad electoral success"},"content":{"rendered":"

Hungary<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Many Hungarian and foreign observers were stunned by the\u00a0Fidesz\u2013KDNP coalition\u2019s crushing victory in the 3 April parliamentary elections. The six-party opposition coalition lost nearly 900,000 votes compared to the cumulative results of those parties in 2018. Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s coalition made progress everywhere and achieved a historic score, while the nationalist party Mi Haz\u00e1nk, admittedly\u00a0in deep disagreement with the government on some issues, but willing to vote with the government majority on others, entered Parliament. In internal politics, the game is more over than ever before: the government forces seem to be alone on the political stage. What happened? Why and how could Viktor Orb\u00e1n manage to achieve such a success\u00a0after twelve years in power?<\/p>\n

The strategy of uniting opposition parties proved to be a fatal error<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In 2019, answering a journalist\u2019s question about what he thought of the opposition\u2019s new coalition strategy, Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n said:<\/p>\n

\u201cIf the opposition takes this path, it will dig its own grave, and I don\u2019t need to prevent that.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This prediction proved to be correct, as the government coalition did not suffer by having to face an \u201call against Orb\u00e1n\u201d alliance. On the contrary, the latest electoral campaign only reinforced its own electoral base.<\/p>\n

According to off-the-record information from analysts close to the government, pollsters already had data in their possession showing a considerable gap between the government coalition and the opposition at the beginning of March, shortly after the outbreak of the Russian\u2013Ukrainian war, as\u00a0the new situation was well managed in terms of political communication by Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n.<\/p>\n

The pollsters were careful not to publish the figures at the time, since neither political camp had any interest in making them known. The gap was ultimately 20 percentage points, or 1,110,936 votes. Even journalists opposed to the government\u2019s policy since 2010 described this result as \u201cbrutal\u201d for the opposition.<\/p>\n

Within a political union, there is always a driving force whose apparatus is more powerful than those of the other groupings. In the present case those driving forces were former socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcs\u00e1ny\u2019s Democratic Coalition (DK) and P\u00e9ter Jakab\u2019s Jobbik. For different reasons, these two parties were not in a position to lead the opposition and present their own candidate against Viktor Orb\u00e1n. In the political game that followed\u00a0the opposition\u2019s primary\u00a0and\u00a0the appointment of a man with no party apparatus, P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay, DK and Jobbik worked for their respective partisan interests, trying to obtain the maximum number of places on the national opposition list and supporting candidates bearing their colours in the constituencies.<\/p>\n

The life of a political party \u2013 that is, its financial health \u2013 depends on the number of electoral mandates it is able to win. A political party must take this imperative into account first and foremost, and grandiloquent speeches of the \u201csacred union\u201d kind are secondary and only made when they do not contravene the interests of the party professing them.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

For Ferenc Gyurcs\u00e1ny\u2019s DK, it is mission accomplished. It had only 4 MPs in 2018 and will have 16 in the new Parliament. Jobbik had 23 deputies in 2018 (the split that led to the creation of Mi Haz\u00e1nk occurred after the 2018 elections) and will now have only 11. However, for a party that has gone through some mind-boggling reversals of political lines, it is not such a bad result.<\/p>\n

Momentum does not have the same massive apparatus as DK and Jobbik, but it has strong networks in Brussels\u2019 Euro-globalist circles. Momentum\u2019s active role in the international criticism of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s Hungary has allowed it to be a key player in the opposition and thus to have been in a position to negotiate good places and ultimately obtain 11 seats in Parliament.<\/p>\n

Momentum\u2019s chairwoman, MEP Anna Don\u00e1th, was the only opposition leader who did not launch into a scapegoat narrative after Sunday night\u2019s results. In her view, the responsibility is collective and no-one in particular should be assigned blame. This attitude shows that her party has much less taste for Hungarian partisan quarrels than for increasing its influence at EU level.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Contrary to what those with a superficial knowledge of the reality of political power relations and the life of political parties might think, strategies of union between parties often end up accentuating the differences, with the united political line becoming secondary, and in a full-fledged battle for places. This rule of political life was all the more true in the Hungarian case because it applied between backers of a list leader with no apparatus, no financial means of his own, and a highly problematic style. But then again, this union included Jobbik, a former far-right party that has converted to the liberal anti-Orb\u00e1n forces, a curiosity that only adds to the weakness of the Hungarian opposition\u2019s strategy of unity. It is indeed clear that the Jobbik voters of 2018 turned away in significant numbers from the united opposition list.<\/p>\n

This rule is certainly counter-intuitive, but it played out in full in Hungary from the autumn of 2021 to the evening of 3 April 2022. Viktor Orb\u00e1n knows this rule perfectly well, and he referred to it in his 2019 statement on the strategy of uniting the opposition forces being potentially counter-productive.<\/p>\n

Cataclysmic erosion of the opposition electorate<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Political observers and leaders often make the mistake of underestimating the average voter\u2019s intelligence. They confuse the ability to put words to a situation with the ability to understand a situation in one\u2019s guts. Even if not able to explain a situation, the average voter can often understand it, and his or her feeling is generally not very far from the conclusions that a good political analyst would draw.<\/p>\n

In this case, with the opposition having lost nearly 900,000 votes compared to the 2018 election, it is clear that a significant number of voters felt perfectly well that the union of the opposition was not about strengthening any alternative political project, but about prioritising the interests of political formations over the interest of voters. All this, as the average voter understood very well, was served by P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay, a man who had absolutely no say in the political-partisan shenanigans of DK, Jobbik and Momentum.\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Without knowing all the ins and outs, the average voter \u2013 and in particular the average Jobbik voter of 2018 \u2013 understood that what was going on behind the scenes in the opposition was anything but an effort with the objective of being able to lead the country. The smoke and mirrors about the \u201cvital need to form a bloc\u201d against Orb\u00e1n could hardly hide the parties\u2019 game, which was clearly won by Ferenc Gyurcs\u00e1ny\u2019s DK.<\/p>\n

Hungarians prefer people to parties<\/strong><\/h4>\n

This accurate sense of the reality of the union strategy was only amplified by the fact that Hungarian political culture tends to turn away from party logic and focus on personality issues. Hungarians have a personalist approach to political life.<\/p>\n

As a matter of fact, with the exception of a committed nationalist fringe (about 5% of the electorate) and those who worship Western liberal democracy (about 5% of the electorate, mainly living in Budapest), Hungarians vote not on the basis of ideas or questions of principle, but on the basis of very prosaic criteria, including what a given candidate evokes to them.<\/p>\n

As disturbing as this may be to a pure Westerner, and especially to a Frenchman, whose nation was built precisely on the decomposition of feudalism in favour of a centralised state, present-day Hungary cannot be understood without taking into consideration the remnant of feudal culture in Hungarian society. Hungarians vote for a leader, a lord, and they need to identify with him, their relationship to their leaders being above all personal.<\/p>\n

Since the regime change in 1989, Viktor Orb\u00e1n is the only leader who has been able to build, over the years, the image of a character with both the stature of a Hungarian lord and a political style that a majority of Hungarians understand.<\/p>\n

This has nothing to do with the figure of a \u201clittle father of the peoples\u201d or a \u201ccult of personality\u201d as some opposition journalists like to suggest. Of course, there is, especially in an educated section of the older female electorate, an unabashed adoration for Viktor Orb\u00e1n (a phenomenon due to the romantic figure of the hairy Viktor Orb\u00e1n of 1989). But this phenomenon is secondary and only marginally explains the Orb\u00e1n dynamic.<\/p>\n

What really matters is what Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s person evokes in the Hungarian electorate. In summary, Viktor Orb\u00e1n has everything that makes up the Hungarian character. Not all those who vote for him are necessarily seduced by his qualities; many are aware that his personality is also an emanation of some typical Hungarian defects. However, the most important thing is that they all see that Viktor Orb\u00e1n is uncompromising and that he covers the whole spectrum of the Hungarian national character. For better or for worse, with all that this entails in terms of qualities and defects.<\/p>\n

Hungarians can be very harsh on their own shortcomings as a people. They like to use self-mockery and, a few sentences later, display a barely overplayed national pride. They feel both immensely proud and at the same time deeply complexed and wounded. Viktor Orb\u00e1n is excellent at playing on both levels. He acts as a Hungarian and thinks as a Hungarian. Voters sense this and see that he is the only one on the political stage who is a natural at this game. Privately, even Budapest\u2019s Western European-oriented voters recognise all this.<\/p>\n

Viktor Orb\u00e1n is the only Hungarian politician who understands the Hungarian soul and stimulates it in his communication and political action. The day after the election results, Budapest lawyer Gy\u00f6rgy Magyar, who is close to the opposition, said: \u201cViktor Orb\u00e1n is an expert on the Hungarian soul, he is the only one who knows it.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Did P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay merely amplify the defeat or cause it?<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Fidesz communicators have used many different terms to describe their opponent P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay: an \u201cimported product\u201d, a \u201cvacuum cleaner salesman\u201d, someone \u201csemi-crazy\u201d, a \u201ctelevangelist\u201d. Such attacks are normal during an election campaign, especially in Hungary, where defamation is the rule, and only the most sensitive feel annoyed by it. To work, however, these attacks must always be based on a shred of tangible reality.<\/p>\n

In this case, it must be said that P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay\u2019s personality and style may have raised doubts. Unquestionably, there was nothing Hungarian about him. Was it a Magyarised American style or an Americanised Hungarian style? It is difficult to describe it, as it is so inconsistent. In any case, the government forces did not even have to pay particular attention to the candidate\u2019s North American background or that of his communications consultant and business marketing professional \u00c1kos Gurz\u00f3, who also spent many years in the United States. They were content to let him speak, as the opposition candidate\u2019s style did not correspond at all to the Hungarian style and to the aforementioned national soul. Everything sounded wrong on P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay\u2019s lips, and it didn\u2019t take long for Hungarians to notice.<\/p>\n

As mentioned above, the negative Hungarian style that a political leader may display does not necessarily act as a deterrent. The most important thing is that this style is Hungarian and that the voters are able to identify with it, however unpleasant it may be for them. P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay will have conveyed only negative traits, and moreover negative in a non-Hungarian way. Observing him interacting with provincial voters was enough to make someone who knows well the Hungarian people realise that.<\/p>\n

Apart from that, it is hard to think of the opposition candidate as anything more than a political amateur. His campaign was a succession of heavy mistakes that even beginners in politics would not have made.<\/p>\n

In an electoral campaign, the basic rules are the following: never shoot live on social networks in front of a camera without preparing your words, never go back on your words, never explain that what you said one day is not what you wanted to say, never say that you agree on certain points with your opponent, never ask for forgiveness, never insult voters (whoever they are), never give too much importance to your opponent by quoting his name at the end of each sentence, never say that there are traitors in your own camp, never underestimate your opponent, etc. If P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay had aimed to make all these mistakes on purpose, he could not have done a better job than what he actually did throughout the campaign.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

But are P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay\u2019s style and person really the only causes of the opposition\u2019s crushing defeat? In the first part of this article, we saw that it was in fact the erroneous strategy of uniting the opposition, and also the political anomaly that Jobbik represents, that was the main cause of this defeat. The candidate\u2019s personality certainly contributed, but it was not the central cause, as journalist Andr\u00e1s Hont, who cannot be suspected of pro-government sympathies, stressed the day after the elections.<\/p>\n

Some remarks on the Budapest intelligentsia<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The author of this article has numerous sources in Budapest\u2019s intellectual, cultural and literary circles, which are mostly dominated by the liberal left and opposed to Viktor Orb\u00e1n. Overall, the tone in these circles was everywhere the same in the wake of Sunday night\u2019s carnage: \u201cIt\u2019s M\u00e1rki-Zay\u2019s fault, he talked nonsense all along the campaign, he\u2019s a moron.\u201d These circles\u2019 contempt for the person of P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay is probably even more brutal than the detestation Fidesz\u2019s hardcore voters have for the opposition candidate. The latter has thus managed to be the exact opposite of what the little people in Hungary are, while at the same time managing to behave in a way that is diametrically opposed to what the Hungarian liberal intellectual elites expect. It\u2019s a real feat.<\/p>\n

The most sincere and experienced of these liberal intellectuals, however, have departed considerably from this general tone and have come up with the following explanation: \u201cWe couldn\u2019t win, we have nothing left to tell people, and it\u2019s nice to be able to blame everything on M\u00e1rki-Zay.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yes, the M\u00e1rki-Zay disaster is very convenient for the liberal elites in Budapest. Thus, these elites do not need to explain why, after almost twelve years of Fidesz\u2013KDNP government, Ferenc Gyurcs\u00e1ny\u2019s political manoeuvres are still so important on the left, why the model of Western liberal democracy is totally outdated (which they know perfectly well), and above all why Viktor Orb\u00e1n is the only one who has the resources to lead Hungary. These elites know all of what has been mentioned above, and they chose to ignore it and point the finger at P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay.<\/p>\n

As a matter of fact, these elites have never been so well-off financially as under Viktor Orb\u00e1n.<\/p>\n

They readily admit it in private: crying dictatorship is a very effective trade. They find it a clever way to make themselves known internationally, to increase their social reach and to develop their capacity to capture subsidies and public money. They do so in a country where they are officially not in power, and they like to pretend that the authorities stifle them, while their way of life is much more comfortable than that of the overwhelming majority of Hungarians, and they know very well that Budapest is in many ways a more pleasant capital to live in than the Western capitals, whether it be from the point of view of its atmosphere or of the freedom of speech that is allowed there.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The author of these lines has friendly relations with dozens of liberal intellectuals in Budapest. When he talks with them about the invented stories concerning freedom of thought being crushed by the Hungarian PM\u2019s dictatorial power, it always gives rise to a loud burst of laughter, and it usually ends in ordering an extra round. Those who swallow the idea that Viktor Orb\u00e1n crushes freedom of expression and oppresses liberal intellectuals do not know much about Hungary.<\/p>\n

Certainly, these Budapest elites approve without saying so the words of P\u00e9ter Ung\u00e1r, a billionaire and politician member of the green party LMP, who is one of their own. These comments were made in the wake of Sunday\u2019s results: \u201cWe have made a campaign for the winners of globalisation [\u2026] We do not understand the country<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Budapest as the liberals\u2019 playground, really?<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Not surprisingly, the opposition got its best scores in Budapest. However, it did not win all the constituencies in the capital, as had been expected, losing two constituencies in eastern Budapest. Moreover, Fidesz\u2013KDNP lost only by a small margin in several working-class districts and made significant progress in an even manner all over Budapest.<\/p>\n

While the opposition remains in the majority in Budapest, it was down everywhere on its 2018 results. In many constituencies, the opposition lost a quarter of its votes compared to 2018, and in some cases more than a third of its votes. Its greatest losses occurred in the most working-class districts, while its smallest loss was recorded in the very wealthy second district of Buda (the right bank of the Danube), where its vote was down by 15.8% all the same.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In Buda, which was a Fidesz stronghold a few years ago, the government coalition no longer has a majority, but is once again scoring over 40% in all constituencies. All this means several things.<\/p>\n

The opposition has lost ground among the less affluent electorate in Budapest, but also in the large and medium-sized provincial cities. In contrast to its breakthrough in the 2019 municipal elections, the opposition lost in all large and medium-sized provincial cities, except in Szeged and part of P\u00e9cs. The population of Buda is becoming more\u00a0bobo-like, but Fidesz still gets a respectable score there. In conclusion: Fidesz is perhaps the only European party to accumulate considerable scores with both a very well-to-do electorate (the population of Buda) and with a strongly working-class electorate (in certain districts of Pest). What is left to the liberal left is only the parts of the big cities that have become more \u201cbobo\u201d. Fidesz is therefore a party that appeals to a very well-to-do electorate that has not been reached by the \u201cboboisation\u201d, as well as to the popular electorate, and obviously also to the provincial electorate. Fidesz\u2013KDNP literally swept up the votes in the provinces, except in Szeged and in part of the centre of P\u00e9cs. The government coalition finished first in 3117 out of 3155 municipalities in Hungary. These are absolutely unprecedented results, and probably a record at European level.<\/p>\n

The humorous party of the dog with two tails (MKKP) achieved its best scores in Budapest. These are undoubtedly votes from the young, who are the electorate that turned away from P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay the most, according to a poll conducted by the left-wing Median institute on the day after the elections.<\/p>\n

The impact of the Russian\u2013Ukrainian war<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In three articles published respectively on\u00a010 March,\u00a0on\u00a016 March, and on\u00a018 March 2022, we explained to what extent and in what way the Hungarian Prime Minister could potentially strengthen his electoral base due to the Russian\u2013Ukrainian war. On election night, a security expert close to the government said in private: \u201cThe magnitude of the victory is due to the war.\u201d<\/p>\n

There is no need to reconsider the contradictory and senseless statements of prime ministerial candidate M\u00e1rki-Zay concerning the Russian\u2013Ukrainian war. The plainest voters quickly realised that it would have been imprudent, even dangerous, to entrust Hungary to a person as confused and unstable as P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay. Again, this is not to say that a growing number of voters are singing the praises of Viktor Orb\u00e1n. Voters simply saw in him a pragmatic leader who did not submit to political correctness and did not hesitate to state with determination that Hungarians\u2019 interests and security come before those of the Ukrainians,\u00a0which is an obvious fact that the overwhelming majority of Hungarians want to hear, regardless of what the self-righteous think.<\/p>\n

The opposition\u2019s strategy of shouting from the rooftops that Orb\u00e1n is Putin\u2019s man did not work, quite the contrary. Hungary is a NATO and EU member, and its economic ties are largely with Western economies. It has condemned the Russian operation in Ukraine, pleaded for an end to the war, and also supported the European sanctions against Russia. It is true that it does not want these to extend to the energy sector. As a matter of fact, Germany wants it even less, but this is more rarely mentioned. Hungarians are not attached to Russian gas, they are attached to cheap gas. If opportunities arose for them to obtain non-Russian gas at the same price, they would be the first to seize them. The opposition, so quick to pathetically defend the little people, has put ideology and its Western affiliations before Hungarians\u2019 concrete and objective interests. It is this attitude that did not go down well on 3 April, and which is another reason for the anti-Orb\u00e1n coalition\u2019s resounding failure.<\/p>\n

What Mi Haz\u00e1nk\u2019s entry to Parliament means<\/strong><\/h4>\n

On\u00a025 January, we mentioned the possibility that the nationalist party Mi Haz\u00e1nk of \u00c1sotthalom mayor\u00a0L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Toroczkai\u00a0might get more than 5% of the national vote and enter parliament. This is what happened, Mi Haz\u00e1nk\u2019s party list having obtained 5.89% of the poll, that is to say 332,323 votes.<\/p>\n

Here is what we wrote then:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe cordon sanitaire that has long prevented this party from claiming respectability is seriously damaged. In private conversations in Budapest, a vote for Mi Haz\u00e1nk is no longer seen by cosmopolitan leftist voters as the mark of a despicable and condemnable movement prone to crypto-fascist romanticism, but as a choice that has become politically understandable and even morally acceptable. The first to have raised, as early as last autumn, the possibility of a rise of Mi Haz\u00e1nk were none other than the liberal journalists Andr\u00e1s Hont and Zolt\u00e1n Cegl\u00e9di, known for their sceptical stances on Covid issues. On 15 January, left-wing lawyer and former LMP leader Andr\u00e1s Schiffer spoke in Kossuth Square at a demonstration against compulsory vaccination of teachers, an event that also included a speech by\u00a0journalist \u00c1rp\u00e1d Szak\u00e1cs, who used to be a supporter of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s government, but is now close to Mi Haz\u00e1nk. \u201d<\/p>\n

When the government then decided in mid-February to remove the bulk of the public health measures, it became fashionable to say that this had definitively dashed Mi Haz\u00e1nk\u2019s hopes of getting into parliament. The outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine on 24 February further accentuated the exit of anti-Covid health policy from the political-media scene. Many observers thought that the game was over for Mi Haz\u00e1nk, that L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Toroczkai and his party would not enter parliament, their main campaign theme having been relegated to the background by international events. However, those observers failed to take into account several groundswells that obviously did not disappear with the political and media reversals that occurred in February.<\/p>\n

To begin with, if at first sight Mi Haz\u00e1nk did not succeed in exciting the crowds with its positioning on the Russian\u2013Ukrainian question (unconditional defence of Hungarian interests, questioning of NATO, opposition to EU sanctions), it should be noted that this positioning pressed on still open wounds: those of the economic, social, and also psychological damage left by the public health measures. Indeed, the nationalist party openly drew parallels between the health issue and the Russian\u2013Ukrainian war, explaining that in the end it is always the Hungarians who pay the bill for wars of interests taking place beyond Hungary.<\/p>\n

Mi Haz\u00e1nk succeeded in conveying the idea that the sanctions approved against Russia, which have terrible consequences for European economies, are in fact a repetition of the public health measures.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Hungarians are well aware that the opening of the fiscal and monetary floodgates in the year leading up to the elections will not last, and that the bill may be high. This is the wound that Mi Haz\u00e1nk skilfully pressed: the one left by interests beyond Hungary that have undermined Hungarians\u2019 freedoms and economic health.<\/p>\n

Second, many observers were lulled into believing that the Jobbik electorate (more than one million votes in 2018, before Mi Haz\u00e1nk was created out of a split within Jobbik) would shift unimpeded to the united opposition. This clearly did not happen, and of the 332,323 votes obtained by Mi Haz\u00e1nk, many are probably from former Jobbik voters who did not like\u00a0the party\u2019s centrist turn. Those who accuse Mi Haz\u00e1nk of being a \u201csatellite party of Fidesz\u201d \u2013 mainly Jobbik members who still feel angry at L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Toroczkai for causing the split \u2013 should, therefore, rather question their mistaken strategy of uniting the opposition against Viktor Orb\u00e1n. A strategy which, as we have seen above, is a central cause of the large victory of Fidesz\u2013KDNP, but also of the entry of Mi Haz\u00e1nk to parliament.<\/p>\n

Third, and this point refers to the paragraph above headed \u201cHungarians prefer people to parties\u201d, Mi Haz\u00e1nk did not make the mistake of running an overly abstract campaign of general slogans. As relevant as campaign slogans may be, they are never enough in an election campaign, especially in Hungary. Mi Haz\u00e1nk, a party that was censored on social networks a few days before the elections, had made the right choice of personalising its campaign from the beginning of January by putting forward the face and the person of L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Toroczkai, but also of D\u00f3ra D\u00far\u00f3, respectively first and second on the national list. Unlike P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay, these two personalities really evoke something in the Hungarian imagination. Hungarians are sensitive to what these two people carry with them.<\/p>\n

Toroczkai evokes the figure of the man from the\u00a0puszta\u00a0<\/em>(the Hungarian plain east of the Danube, a region charged with tragic romanticism in the identity and history of Hungary), both combative and physically imposing, but also imbued with historical knowledge and gifted with a sensitivity to his country\u2019s traumas. All this while emanating an image of typical Hungarian resourcefulness. In short, he refers in a certain way to the image of the\u00a0Hungarian bety\u00e1r\u00a0<\/em>(brigand of the plain in the 19th century, a kind of Robin Hood in the Hungarian imagination). Whether or not you like it is not the point. The main thing is that Laszl\u00f3 Toroczkai corresponds well to certain parts of the Hungarian style. D\u00f3ra D\u00far\u00f3 is a mother of four children who is adamant about protecting families. In 2010 she was elected an MP as a 23-year-old, and has the image of someone who puts the protection of her own children and the protection of her country on the same level.<\/p>\n

Voters who do not vote for Mi Haz\u00e1nk, but who nevertheless have a good grounding in Hungary\u2019s soul and history, are well aware that the two major figures of the nationalist party stimulate many aspects of the Hungarian unconscious. That kind of stimulation did not work at all in the case of P\u00e9ter M\u00e1rki-Zay.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As a general conclusion, it is the accumulation of all the elements mentioned above and their simultaneity which led to the large victory of Fidesz\u2013KDNP on 3 April 2022. All the analyses about the \u201cgovernment propaganda machine\u201d that artificially led to Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s re-election are pure fantasies. As for those who complain about the Hungarian electoral system, they should have a look at the British electoral system, as it would have allowed Viktor Orb\u00e1n to achieve an even greater majority in parliament with the same votes. And what about the French system, thanks to which, in 2017, a president was elected \u201cagainst hatred and totalitarianism\u201d in the second round, while his electoral base in the first round was a lot weaker than Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s? Hungarians are neither stupid nor fools. Their history has taught them not to be under any illusion about what they are told. They are far more expert in understanding manipulation than Westerners are. As a whole, Hungarians want very simple things: peace, calm, respect, and security for their country. They felt very keenly that it was certainly not the \u201cunited\u201d opposition that could bring them all this. It is above all on this basis that they made their choice on 3 April.<\/p>\n

\n
<\/div>\n

Photo : marche pour la paix du 15 mars 2022 \/ Source : page Facebook du Fidesz<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Hungary\u00a0\u2013 Many Hungarian and foreign observers were stunned by the\u00a0Fidesz\u2013KDNP coalition\u2019s crushing victory in the 3 April parliamentary elections. The six-party opposition coalition lost nearly 900,000 votes compared to the cumulative results of those parties in 2018. Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s coalition made progress everywhere and achieved a historic score, while the nationalist party Mi Haz\u00e1nk, admittedly\u00a0in<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":4830,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"subtitle":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5268","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news"],"acf":{"subtitle":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5268","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5268"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5268\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4830"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5268"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5268"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/visegradpost.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5268"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}